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Abstract
Policies that reduce emissions of greenhouse gases can simultaneously alter emissions
of conventional pollutants that have deleterious effects on human health and the environment.
This paper first describes how these "ancillary" benefits--benefits in addition to reduced risks
of climate change--can result from greenhouse gas (GHG) mitigation efforts.  It then discusses
methodologies for assessing ancillary benefits and provides a critical review of estimates
associated with reductions of criteria air pollutants.  We find that these benefits in the U.S.
may be significant, indicating a higher level of "no regrets" greenhouse gas abatement than
might be expected based on simple economic calculations of abatement cost.  However, the
magnitude of ancillary benefits realized by any program of GHG mitigation is highly
dependent on the location, pollutant, degree of exposure, and the economic behavior of
individuals in response to the program.  It is also highly dependent on the interaction of GHG
abatement policies with the policies used for regulating conventional pollutants.  We identify
a rule of thumb to suggest ancillary benefits could be on the order of 30 percent of the
incremental cost of GHG mitigation.  For modest carbon reduction that do not result in
changes in emissions of sulfur dioxide by electric utilities, ancillary benefits may be as high as
$7 per ton.  Greater benefits could be obtained with larger GHG reductions, although the costs
of abatement would also be much greater.
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THE BENEFITS OF REDUCED AIR POLLUTANTS IN THE U.S.
FROM GREENHOUSE GAS MITIGATION POLICIES
Dallas Burtraw and Michael Toman*
I. INTRODUCTION
Fossil fuel combustion, agricultural activity and changes in land use are increasing
atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases (GHGs).  Theses changes in the atmosphere are
widely held to cause changes in the earth's climate, changes that could have adverse effects on
natural systems and human interests (IPCC, 1995).  Policy makers worldwide have been
exploring options to prevent dangerous human interference in the climate system by slowing the
growth in emissions of GHGs.  To a large extent, the analysis of policies for GHG abatement
has focused on their potential for reducing the rate of increase in atmospheric concentrations of
greenhouse gases, and the economic costs of the emissions abatement measures.
A number of actions to slow atmospheric GHG accumulation would also tend to
reduce "conventional" environmental pollutants.  The benefits that result would be "ancillary"
to GHG abatement and could be manifested in several ways.  Moreover, these benefits would
tend to accrue in the near term, while any benefits from reduced climate change mostly accrue
over a time frame of several decades or longer.  In addition, ancillary benefits accrue largely
to those countries undertaking mitigation action, in contrast to the benefits of reduced climate
change risks that accrue at a global level.
A failure to adequately consider these ancillary benefits could lead to an incorrect
assessment of the "net costs" of mitigation policies -- that is, the direct cost of climate policy
less ancillary benefits that accrue from those policies -- and an incorrect identification of "no
regrets" levels of GHG mitigation.  It also could lead to the choice of a policy that was
unnecessarily expensive because of its failure to fully exploit potential ancillary benefits.  To
illustrate these issues, we consider how GHG reductions from reduced fossil fuel use could
reduce various "criteria" air pollutants (as defined in the Clean Air Act), which we argue are
likely to constitute the lion's share of ancillary benefits in the US.
The analysis indicates that average ancillary benefits from modest GHG emissions
limits themselves are likely to be modest, when measured in terms of benefits per ton of
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carbon reduction, but they are still worth taking into account.  A modest policy with an
average cost per ton of carbon abated in the range of $10-20 could yield benefits that average
$3-7 per ton, when measured in terms of benefits per ton of carbon reduction.  Larger than
average benefits would occur in locations with greater population density and higher levels of
exposure to damages from criteria air pollutants.
Larger ancillary benefits on average for the nation could be obtained with more
aggressive GHG controls, though these benefits themselves are not enough to offset the costs
of abatement.  These benefits could average $12-18 per ton of carbon reduced ($20-$30 at the
margin) for a policy in which the average costs of each ton of carbon reduced may be on the
order of $40-50 ($100 at the margin).  Effectively, the ancillary benefits function is increasing
with the level of GHG control over relevant values, due to the interaction of GHG policies
with pre-existing regulations governing conventional pollutants.
We identify a rough rule of thumb that applies across the range of climate policies being
considered that suggests ancillary benefits could be about 30 percent of the cost per ton of carbon
reduced.  In any case, there is considerable uncertainty about the size of ancillary benefits that
precludes the identification of a single "best estimate" of their magnitude.  The size of ancillary
benefits also varies with the choice of policy for obtaining a given level of GHG control.
Section II of the paper provides further background on ancillary environmental
benefits from GHG abatement.  Section III provides an introduction to methodological issues
arising in the estimation of ancillary benefits.  Section IV is a critical review of previous
estimates of ancillary benefits from reduced criteria air pollutants in the U.S. and provides
references to studies in other contexts.  Section V contains some new estimates that illustrate
the importance of locational issues.  Section VI draws together and compares the estimates.
Section VII concludes the paper.
II. BACKGROUND
Our empirical focus is on reduction of "criteria" air pollutants (as defined in the Clean Air
Act) from reduced fossil fuel use.  The pollutants of interest include sulfur dioxide (SO2),
nitrogen oxides (NOX), carbon monoxide (CO), particulates (PM), and tropospheric ozone (O3).1
Lead (Pb) also is an important criteria pollutant and is included in some ancillary benefits
calculations, but given the stringency of existing control measures the additional lead reduction
benefits from GHG policies probably are small.
There is an extensive scientific literature on the adverse human health effects caused
by exposure to criteria air pollutants.2  Human health effects are widely seen as significant,
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though the size of these effects depends on the magnitude and duration of exposure to specific
pollutants, and the nature of the exposed population, among other factors.  These effects
include, among other things, the initiation or aggravation of various pulmonary disorders, as
well as cardiovascular problems; the effects result in premature mortality as well as illness.
Reductions in premature mortality from reduced exposure to various forms of
particulates typically account for about 75-85 percent of all estimated benefits in economic
assessments of improved air quality (Lee et al., 1995; EC, 1995; Rowe et al., 1995; Krupnick
and Burtraw, 1997; Burtraw et al., 1997).  The pollutants described as particulates take a
number of forms and arise from a number of sources.  Particulates include soot emitted
directly from the combustion process, soil dust (often mobilized in the air due to human
activities), and secondary pollutants such as sulfate and nitrate aerosols that form chemically
in the atmosphere from SO2 and NOX.  The various particulate substances are found in
different proportions in different areas, and they have different degrees of impact on human
health.  Of the various types of particulates, there is particular concern about the potency of
sulfate and nitrate aerosols.
Another secondary pollutant that impairs human respiration is O3, which is formed
from the mixing of NOX and volatile hydrocarbons (VOCs) in sunlight.  While there are some
short-term health effects from increases in O3 concentrations, there is little evidence that ozone
is associated with long-term illness or premature mortality for most of the population, and
consequently O3 receives much less weight than particulates in economic analysis.  CO, while
obviously fatal at high concentrations, has much more limited health effects (primarily related
to cardiovascular systems) at ambient exposure levels normally encountered.  Moreover, CO
emissions are decreasing over time as new vehicles with low emissions replace older vehicles.
At high enough concentrations, criteria air pollutants can also damage ecosystems.
NOX and SO2 are precursors to acidic deposition (commonly referred to as "acid rain") that
has adverse effects on some forest aquatic ecosystems.  Atmospheric deposition of nitrogen
also is a potentially significant contributor to damaging algae blooms in certain estuaries (e.g.,
the Chesapeake Bay).  Both SO2 and O3 can produce foliar damage in a number of crops and
trees; O3 is responsible for agricultural yield losses in the U.S. valued at several billion dollars
each year, while the damages to forests and other ecosystems is still being assessed.
Criteria air pollutants also impair visibility and damage materials, affecting both aesthetic
and property values.  Airborne sulfates, for example, tend to impair visibility.  Particulate matter
causes soiling and acid rain accelerates the decay of buildings, statues, and monuments.
To understand the potential for GHG policies to reduce such damages, we note first
that the vast majority of the U.S. economy's GHG emissions stem from fossil fuel
combustion.  The U.S. economy satisfies the lion's share of its energy needs with coal,
petroleum and natural gas.  U.S. energy consumption amounted to nearly 91 quadrillion Btu
(quads) in 1995 (having risen from about 66 quads in 1970), of which 85 percent was
provided by fossil fuels.  Energy consumption was split not quite equally across transportation
(27 percent), industrial (37 percent) and residential/commercial users (35 percent).  Petroleum
is the dominant energy source for transportation; coal and natural gas are the primary energyBurtraw and Toman RFF 98-01-REV
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sources for industrial and residential/commercial energy needs.  Hydroelectric and nuclear
power accounted for one-third of electric power generation.3
Natural gas (methane) is the least carbon-intensive fossil fuel per unit of energy
content, and it is also a relatively "clean" fuel in the sense of conventional pollutants.  The
main pollutant resulting from its combustion are relatively small amounts of NOX.  Petroleum
products have intermediate carbon intensity and can generate significant emissions of PM,
SO2, NOX, VOCs, and (in older cars) CO, again in the absence of effective emissions controls.
Coal is the most carbon intensive of the fossil fuels, and its combustion also generates
relatively high criteria pollutant emissions (especially SO2, NOx, and PM) in the absence of
effective emissions controls (which, if used, can reduce these pollutants considerably).
However, current regulatory standards require very stringent controls on dust and soot (PM)
from stationary sources like power plants, and these controls reduce emissions substantially.
The most likely sources of reductions in particulate concentrations and large ancillary
benefits from GHG policies that reduce energy use would be reduced sulfate aerosols formed
by emissions of SO2 from fuels that contain sulfur (coal and petroleum), reduced nitrate
aerosols from NOX created by all types of fuel burning, and reduced fine particulates from
diesel engine emissions.
III. METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES IN ASSESSING ANCILLARY BENEFITS
The studies of air pollution impacts from GHG control we review below can be
divided into two categories.  One group combines computable general equilibrium models of
the U.S. economy with estimates of emissions rates in various industries to relate changes in
price from energy taxes to changes in investment, changes in efficiency, changes in CO2
emissions, and commensurate changes in emissions of criteria air pollutants.  A second group
of studies has employed disaggregated models of the U.S. electric utility industry to examine
changes in investment and facility operations (dispatch) and ultimately changes in emissions
that result from more narrow policy initiatives or reforms.  Examples of such narrower
initiatives include reform of electricity transmission pricing, improvements in the efficiency
of electricity distribution transformers, the "Green Lights" program to promote efficient
lighting, and seasonal burns of natural gas in place of coal.
Studies in both groups indicate that significant reduction in NOx and CO are possible as
a result of policies aimed primarily at reducing CO2 emissions (Scheraga and Herrod 1993).
The studies vary in their predictions about reductions in SO2 depending on their treatment of
the emission allowance trading program under the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments.
Reductions in VOCs or direct particulate emissions that are likely to result from CO2 policies
are significantly smaller than the NOx and CO reductions for the particular policies examined
in the studies surveyed.  Secondary pollutants (sulfates and nitrates as particulates, or ozone)
are treated in an inconsistent manner across these studies, and often are not mentioned at all.
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source of unpredictable variation.5  They also find that the large majority of quantifiable
damages from electricity fuel cycles are attributable to criteria air pollutants, so in many cases
it may be sufficient to concentrate analysis on these pollutants.
An analysis of benefits requires a clear definition of a baseline against which the
prospective scenario can be measured.  The actual extent of emissions reductions depends
critically not just on the energy type, but also on the technologies used for combusting the
fossil fuels and trapping pollutants in the waste gas stream.  It is necessary to specify these
factors -- which depend on the characteristics and usage of current combustion technologies
and how incentives for usage are altered by the GHG policy -- in calculating the ancillary
environmental benefits of GHG control.6
In a static analysis the baseline can be treated as the status quo, but since climate
policy inherently is a longer-term effort, questions arise about projecting energy use,
technology investments, and emissions of GHGs and criteria pollutants with and without the
GHG policy.  It also is important to account for changes in population, especially since
population trends have greatly outstripped energy prices over the last century.7  U.S.
population is expected to grow by 45 percent over just the next fifty years, suggesting that
there will be greater exposure to a given level of pollution and consequently greater benefits
from reducing that pollution.  This demographic consideration suggests that the reported
values for conventional pollutants in current studies underestimate damage in future years, if
all other things are equal.
The issue is confounded, however, because of ongoing changes in the standards for
criteria air pollutants.  The recent tightening of standards for ozone and particulates and
associated improvements in environmental performance over time imply that benefits from
reductions in criteria air pollutants resulting from climate policies will be smaller in the future
                                               
5  The social cost studies also have enabled the development of tools that greatly accelerate the analysis of diverse
environmental impacts.  See the Tracking and Analysis Framework (TAF) presented in Bloyd et al. (1996) and
Burtraw et al. (1997) for a model of acid rain benefits and costs.  A product of the Rowe et al. (1995) study was a
computer program that can predict impacts from a power plant at any location in New York State, for a variety of
fuel choices and plant designs.  To accomplish this the model includes a reduced form atmospheric transport
model to characterize the dispersion portion of the damage function approach.  This model, named EXMOD,
would not be sufficient for a full-blown environmental impact assessment, but it is a useful and relatively
sophisticated tool for planning and policy evaluation which we use in subsequent parts of the paper.
6 To make the point more sharply, a shift from coal to biomass for electricity generation could increase
particulate emissions in the absence of adequate control equipment.  Increased energy efficiency could increase
indoor air pollution, including radon exposure, and increased switching from coal to gas raises the issue of
fugitive methane emissions, since methane is a more potent greenhouse gas than CO2.  While our focus in this
paper is on the potential for environmental improvement, the possibility of some decrease in environmental
performance should also be kept in mind.
7 In real terms, energy prices have been about constant for the last century.  The price of oil in the U.S. has
fluctuated between $15 and $20/bbl for about a 100 years, except for the period 1974-1985 (Bohi and Toman,
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than in the present.  Estimates of future ancillary benefits based on historical or current values
should be adjusted downward accordingly.
An important example of this issue concerning regulatory baselines is the impact on
ancillary benefits from GHG policy of the cap on SO2 emissions from electric utilities and
emission allowance trading program in the U.S.  A consequence of the current emissions cap is
that aggregate SO2 emissions from electric utilities (the major source category in the U.S.) are
not likely to change much as a result of smaller-scale GHG emissions reductions.  However, if
climate policies are sufficiently stringent that utilities substitute away from coal in significant
fashion and the long-run annual level of SO2 emissions is less than the annual emissions cap,
then ancillary benefits from further reductions in SO2 would be achieved.  However, if the
current cap is lowered as part of the effort to implement a tighter standard on fine particulates,
then ancillary benefits arising from SO2 control would be reduced accordingly.
There may be an economic benefit associated with ancillary SO2 reductions even with
a binding emissions cap.  Under the cap, a facility that reduces its SO2 emissions makes
allowances available for another facility, displacing the need for abatement investment at that
facility.  In principle, then, this savings through avoided abatement investments should be
reckoned as one of the ancillary benefits of the CO2 policy.
The extent to which this cost reduction benefit should be counted in practice depends
on the analytical framework being used to calculate environmental compliance costs.  If the
cost-side framework automatically captures the reallocation of SO2 allowances and abatement
effort when assessing the economic impacts of the CO2 policy, then the abatement cost
savings identified in the previous paragraph already are incorporated in calculating the
opportunity cost of the CO2 policy.  In this case it would be incorrect double-counting to also
include avoided SO2 abatement costs as an ancillary benefit.  In practice, the computable
general equilibrium models used in the ancillary estimates reviewed below appear to be
calibrated with data from years that do not reflect the costs of the SO2 cap and trade program
in the electricity sector.  Consequently, the appropriate ancillary benefit measure to compare
with CO2 abatement costs derived from these models should include the avoided costs of
investments in SO2 abatement.
With particulate and ozone standards recently revised, and with new NOx reduction
rules for electric utility boilers and others in the offing through the workings of the Ozone
Transport Region (OTR) and the Ozone Transport Assessment Group (OTAG), should
estimates of the current benefits of reducing emissions of criteria pollutants be modified to
reflect expected declines in emissions in the future?8  If one proceeds on the basis of historical
standards and ignores expected changes in the standards, the ancillary benefit estimate will
overstate environmental savings.  By the same token, however, historically based CO2
abatement cost estimates that do not incorporate the effects of new pollutant caps will
overstate the opportunity cost of CO2 reductions.
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The economic principle that guides our analysis is that the ancillary benefit assessment
should employ assumptions consistent with those underlying the assessment of GHG abatement
costs.  Hence, a comparison of the benefits from criteria air pollutants with the cost of climate
policies estimated by the CGE models to date should use estimates of SO2 emission allowance
prices as a proxy for avoided marginal abatement cost, and add this estimate of economic
benefit to the other ancillary benefits from reduced criteria pollutants that are not capped.  For
other pollutants, we suggest that use of historic emission rates rather than ones expected in the
future may be more appropriate for assessment of ancillary benefits if these also have been
used in assessing the costs of GHG policies with which benefits are to be compared.
IV. REVIEW OF PREVIOUS ANCILLARY BENEFITS ESTIMATES
Previous efforts to characterize ancillary benefits from changes in emissions of
conventional air pollutants in the U.S. have employed general and partial equilibrium models
of the economy, but all have relied on average estimates of the benefits of reduced emissions
without consideration of atmospheric transport of emissions or representation of the exposed
population.  Table 1 summarizes some of the key studies.
Goulder (1993) is one of three modeling efforts that have examined fiscal policies aimed
at reducing CO2 emissions within a general equilibrium model.  The model incorporates the
intertemporal investment and savings decisions of firms and households, and also accounts for
household labor supply decisions.  Primary emissions of eight pollutants are modeled (TSP, SOx,
NOx, VOCs, CO, Pb, PM10 and CO2).  The model uses fuel-based industry-specific average
emission rates, including emissions from mobile sources.  Emissions over and above those that
can be attributed to fuel use are attributed to output for each industry.  Emission factors are held
constant at 1990 levels in the initial specification.  In sensitivity analysis, SO2 emissions from
the electric utility industry are held constant, in light of the emission allowance trading program,
and NOx, VOCs and CO emission rates are varied over time to reflect changes in mobile source
emissions.  NOx emission changes from Title IV of the 1990 Clean Air Act are not modeled.
There is also no modeling of the economic value of avoided external damages.
The base case in the Goulder model, which ignores the SO2 cap and other expected
changes in emissions, is extended by Scheraga and Leary (1993) to estimate a level of CO2
emission reductions sufficient to return to 1990-level emissions in the year 2000, about
8.6 percent relative to the base case projection in the model.9  When a carbon tax is used for
this purpose, the emission reductions for conventional pollutants range from 1.4 percent
(VOC) to 6.6 percent (NOx).  They append estimates of the monetary value of avoided health
damage culled from a variety of sources, including EPA Regulatory Impact Assessments from
the 1980s.  They estimate reductions in VOCs, SOx, particulates and NOx emissions resulting
from the carbon tax, yielding benefits in the range of $300 million to $3 billion, with benefits
about 33 percent greater for a Btu tax.  Although the authors do not make this comparison, a
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Table 1.  Description of previous studies of air pollution reduction benefits from greenhouse gas limitations
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rough estimate of the cost of this level of taxation suggests that about one quarter of the cost
of the policy is offset by the value of criteria air pollutant reductions.
Jorgenson et al. (1995) provides another dynamic general equilibrium model that includes
adjustments for projected technical change on an industry basis.  Externalities related to global
climate change and to criteria air pollutants and acid rain resulting from energy use are modeled.
The climate damage values rise over time to reflect the relationship between accumulated
greenhouse gases and damages.  The 1990 Clean Air Amendments are not reflected in the study.
The externality values for reductions in conventional pollutants are unit values adapted from the
survey of cost-benefit studies and other research compiled in Viscusi et al. (1993), adjusted down
to reduce the estimate of premature mortality associated with sulfur oxides.
These energy related externalities are converted into tax rates under several different
scenarios accommodating a range of values for climate and conventional externalities, and
they are internalized into prices through ad valorem energy taxes, ranging from a 1 percent
markup for natural gas to a 197% markup for coal, under their benchmark scenario.  The
authors also investigate the performance of several strategies for recycling revenue from an
energy tax.  Their results conform with a "strong form" of the double-dividend hypothesis
(Goulder, 1995).  This means they find negative (gross) economic costs (that is, positive
benefits) from the energy taxes, as measured by equivalent variation defined over goods,
services and leisure, when the revenues are used to displace property taxes or capital taxes,
even when environmental benefits are not considered.10  Further, when revenue is recycled by
reducing labor taxes, in which case the net economic cost of abatement is positive, the authors
find the net benefits of the policy to be positive once reduced conventional pollutant damages
are taken into account (not including climate related benefits).
Boyd, Krutilla and Viscusi (1995) use a simpler general equilibrium model, with land
treated as a separate factor of production, to consider ad valorem  taxes on fuels, with revenues
rebated in lump-sum fashion to taxpayers (so there are no gains from recycling revenues to
reduce other taxes).  Pollutants considered are the same as in Jorgenson et al. (1995) and
environmental benefit estimates are drawn directly from Viscusi et al. (1993).  The "optimal"
tax levels in the analysis are defined as those that maximize the sum of benefits from reducing
conventional environmental externalities (excluding any benefits from reducing carbon
emissions) less the economic costs of the tax.  In the base case the optimal carbon  emission
reductions are 0.19 billion tons (about 12 percent of total emissions).  The authors report the
optimal ad valorem tax on coal is about 45 percent, comparable to a $8/ton carbon charge.11
The authors also identify the "no regrets" level of reduction in the analysis as the point at which
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net benefits from internalizing conventional environmental externalities drop to zero.  This is
equal to 0.5 billion tons (a 29 percent reduction), which would be achieved with a $13 tax per
ton carbon (leading to a 54 percent ad valorem tax on coal).  In the case of a higher substitution
elasticity between energy and other factors of production, the no regrets level of carbon
reduction is estimated to be about 0.8 billion tons (49 percent reduction).
Two other modeling efforts are based on frameworks that include considerable detail
about the electricity industry.  ICF (1995) used the DEGREES model to examine four out of
approximately 50 actions identified in the Climate Change Action Plan announced by the
Clinton Administration in 1993, and the impact these actions would have on electricity
demand, generation, and associated emissions (ICF, 1995).  These actions included expansion
of the Green Lights Program, energy efficient electrical motor systems (Motor Challenge),
improvement of hydroelectric generation, and reform of electricity transmission pricing.
Pollutants modeled include NOX, SO2, CO, TSP, VOCs, and PM10.
The study examines the change in emissions on a geographic basis, according to North
American Electric Reliability Council (NERC) Regions.  Regional variation in emission
changes stems in large part from the variation in technologies providing electricity at the
margin and that would be affected by each of the actions.  In some regions of the country, for
example, gas facilities would be more likely to be displaced while in other regions coal
facilities may be displaced, and these fuels and technologies typically have very different
emission rates.  The study is unique because it examines changes on a seasonal and time-of-
day temporal basis, by modeling changes in the electricity load duration curve and facility
operation.  In addition, the study is the most comprehensive in the consideration of changes in
emission rates already destined to occur due to provisions in Title IV of the 1990 Clean Air
Act Amendments.  The study suggests that SO2 emissions will be approximately invariant to
the actions that are studied, though the timing of emission reductions under Title IV may be
affected by the policies that were evaluated.  Baseline NOx emissions are also projected to fall
due to the requirements of Title IV.
The study results could be used for a geographic analysis of atmospheric transport of
pollution and exposure of the population, and economic valuation of emission changes, but
this was not attempted.  To supplement this analysis, we fed these emission changes into
PREMIERE, a model built at Resources for the Future that employs a reduced-form
atmospheric transport model linked to monetary valuation of health impacts at a NERC region
level.12  We consider the emission reductions for NOx that would result from the most
influential action studied, Motor Challenge, and estimate health benefits resulting from
changes in direct emissions and secondary nitrate concentrations to be $352 per ton of avoided
NOx emissions (54,120 tons), totaling $19.4 million (1992$).  These benefits accrue with a 6.2
million ton reduction in carbon emissions.
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The regional percentages of total health benefits that result from these emission
reductions vary significantly from the percentages of emission changes themselves.  For
example, ECAR (the Ohio Valley) produces 19 percent of the emission reductions, but
captures 30 percent of the health benefits, due largely to long-range transport from downwind
regions to its west.  This estimate excludes the contribution of NOx to ozone formation, and
does not address visibility impairment and other environmental impacts of nitrogen
deposition.  However, it is likely to capture the lion's share of measurable economic value due
to the inclusion of suspected mortality effects, which tend to dominate the economic valuation
of conventional pollutant impacts.
Dowlatabadi et al. (1993) employ another detailed model of the electric utility system
called the Energy Policy Assessment model to assess emission changes at the regional level.
This modeling effort was based on a 1987 plant inventory, and it did not include changes
resulting from the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments.  Pollutants that were modeled in addition
to CO2 were SO2, NOx and TSP. In common with the ICF model, this model reported results
by NERC region.  The model was used to consider technology including seasonal gas
burning; use of externality adders in dispatch of facilities; extension of the life of nuclear
facilities; elimination of federal subsidies; and improvement of the efficiency of electricity
distribution transformers.
A main contribution of the study was to illuminate the potential importance of double-
counting of emission changes when individual policies affect the same endpoints.  The
emission changes from these policies are not additive because the policies taken separately
would each capture the same low-cost substitution opportunities that would not be available in
similar degree to the policies taken as a group.  The ratio of the emission changes for NOX for
the strategies considered collectively is 11 percent less than the sum of emission changes when
the policies are considered separately in the short run scenario.  The study also illuminates
potential perverse effects from technology policy.  For example, the NOx emissions that could
result as people switch to gas use for home and water heating because of the effect on
electricity prices of a policy could be greater than the emissions from controlled electricity
generation sources to provide the same energy services.  In addition, distributed emissions
throughout a metropolitan area could have greater environmental damages than emissions from
sources more distant from population centers, potentially offsetting some of the ancillary
benefits from carbon policies.
Again, we supplement the analysis by feeding predicted emission changes into
PREMIERE.  We consider the short run emission reductions for NOx that would result from the
seasonal gas burn policy.  The health benefits that result from direct emissions and secondary
nitrate concentrations are estimated by PREMIERE to be $121 per ton of avoided NOx emissions
(1.04 million tons), totaling $126 million (1992$).  These benefits accrue with a 47 million ton
reduction in carbon emissions.  Note that the benefits per ton are about one-third of the benefits
that result from ICF/PREMIERE.  This reflects the difference in the location of emission
changes in the two models which produces a difference in the atmospheric transport of pollutants
and the size of the exposed populations.Burtraw and Toman RFF 98-01-REV
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Finally, we refer to another body of literature that has emerged in the European context.
These studies suggest that ancillary benefits are likely to exist and may be significant, but they
are unreliable sources for concrete benefit estimates.  Pearce (1992) uses average emission
coefficients to relate potential changes in emissions of criteria pollutants to CO2 emissions in
the UK and unit values for damages per ton from a "restricted" report to value future
reductions.  Barker (1993), Barker et al. (1993) and Alfsen (1993) use macro level data or
models to develop more careful predictions of changes in secondary emissions from various
sectors of the economy for the UK and Norway, respectively.
For economic valuation of these changes Barker uses aggregated unit values from
Ottinger et al. (1990) for a measure of damage, and Newberry (1990) for a measure of avoided
abatement investments.  Both these measures are on the high side of valuation measures
identified by recent social cost studies reviewed in Krupnick and Burtraw (1997), lending an
upward bias to estimates of ancillary benefits.  Alfsen (1993) uses benefit estimates developed
in the Norwegian context with respect to commodity values for timber and fish, and contingent
valuation studies of recreational opportunities, the economic life of materials, and road traffic,
so it is difficult to compare them to other estimates.  The basis for their health benefits are U.S.
epidemiological studies, "expert assessment" and assumptions used where necessary to fill in
for missing values.  This approach leads to emission-related benefits of slightly more than
$100/ton carbon, which are lower than those for Barker and for Pearce, and which are coupled
with non-emission related benefits from reduced fuel use that are 1.5 times as great to yield
total benefits comparable in magnitude to Barker and to Pearce.
Ekins (1996) reviews the European literature and suggests a benchmark of $227 in
ancillary benefits per ton carbon reduction (1990$), about half of which is from reduced sulfur
emissions.  This estimate does not take into account reductions in emissions that are
anticipated, especially resulting from the 1994 European Second Sulfur Protocol, which we
discuss below, and consider in adjusting this benchmark.
V. AN  ILLUSTRATION  OF  THE  NEED  FOR  GREATER  RESOLUTION  IN
ANCILLARY  BENEFITS  ESTIMATION
In this section we explore the sensitivity of benefit estimates for emission reductions in
the electricity sector with respect to several factors: emission rates of pollutants for different
technologies, the impact of emissions in different locations, and the valuation of impacts.  We
conduct this analysis by constructing alternatives scenarios in the EXMOD modeling
framework (see footnote 5), which accommodates alternative specification of technologies
and location of electricity generation in New York, and predicts impacts and monetized
damages that result.  The application to New York State is intended to illustrate of the
importance of these variables in the national context.
In Table 2 we report the variation in tons of particulates, sulfur oxides, nitrogen oxides
and carbon dioxide per kWh of electricity generation from three hypothetical vintage 1995
technology applications as calculated in EXMOD.  We also report comparable rates forBurtraw and Toman RFF 98-01-REV
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generic technologies based on Viscusi et al. (1993),13 which formed the basis for benefit
numbers used by Boyd et al. and Jorgenson et al.  In addition, we report emission rates for an
average in-place coal-fired power plant in New York in 1992.14  The fact that emission rates
vary dramatically with fuel type is no surprise.  However, new and existing facilities using the
same fuel type also have significantly different emission rates, as illustrated in the comparison
of coal technologies.  For instance, the emission rate for nitrogen oxides from an average
existing coal plant in New York State in 1992 is 1.5 times that which would result from a coal
plant constructed under 1995 standards; a relatively dirty plant is likely to have emission rates
several times as great.
Table 2.  Emission rates for various pollutants under alternative technological assumptions
pounds/megawatt hour Particulates Sulfur Dioxide Nitrogen Oxides Carbon Dioxide
New plants in New York State using
EXMOD (Hagler-Bailly, 1995)
Natural Gas Combustion Turbine 0.14 0.02 0.58 1698
Natural Gas Combined Cycle 0.08 0 0.16 906
Coal (steam) 0.32 3.84 4.14 2168
Average emissions at 1980 facilities
(Viscusi et al., 1993)
Natural Gas Combustion Turbine 0.04 0.02 6.54 1698
Natural Gas Combined Cycle 0.02 0 3.5 906
Coal (steam) 0.58 19.94 8.76 2168
Existing NY average plant (Rowe et
al., 1996; and Hagler-Bailly, 1995)
Coal (steam) 0.4 19.96 6.4 2168
The policy that is used to achieve a given climate goal will affect the ancillary benefits
that are realized.  For example, if it is geared only at new sources it is likely to affect natural
gas facilities with an emission rate for NOx that is 1/30 that of existing coal steam plants.  Such
policies impose an anti-new source bias that may delay investment in new facilities and lead to
increased utilization of existing facilities with higher emission rates (Palmer et al, 1995).
The most important issues related to criteria air pollutants do not concern direct
emissions, but rather chemical transformations of those direct emissions into secondary air
pollutants, such as ground level ozone and particulates.  Transformation of primary pollutants
                                               
13 These rates serve as the basis for estimates in the Boyd et al. 1995 study discussed previously.  The emission
rates for CO2 associated with Viscusi are estimated from EXMOD, since Viscusi does not report these rates.
14 The technology parameters for the existing plant are described in Rowe et al. (1996).  The emission rates we
model using EXMOD vary only slightly from those estimated by Rowe et al. using parameters in their Table 4,
for Facility B.Burtraw and Toman RFF 98-01-REV
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into these secondary pollutants takes place over space and time.15  Linear reduced-form
relationships, even if very simple, can provide meaningful approximations of these
transformation processes that heretofore have been represented in an arbitrary fashion or
ignored in studies of the ancillary benefits of CO2 policies.
Table 3 reports damages (1992 $) per kWh for a new coal steam plant sited at three
different locations in New York State--rural, suburban and urban -- as calculated by EXMOD.
SO2 damages are characterized with and without the influence of the SO2 emission allowance
cap and trading program.  With the cap, net emissions of SO2 from electric utilities at a
national level are constant but the impacts of emissions nonetheless vary with their location.
EXMOD values offsetting emission changes according to the relative population density in the
vicinity where emissions occur.  As noted previously, for comparison with costs of climate
policies under an emissions cap, it may be appropriate to include economic benefits from
avoided abatement investments at other facilities.  The "TOTAL w/cap" reported in the right-
hand column includes estimated benefits from avoided investment in SO2 abatement at another
facility.16  Damages estimated without the cap represent benefits of emission reductions if total
SO2 emissions were to fall below the level of the cap.
The range of estimates in Table 3 characterized as low, mid, and high correspond to
the 20th, 50th and 80th percentiles of a confidence interval for damages.  The estimates in
Table 3 indicate that while the range of values typically differ by over a factor of two between
the low and high, they differ almost as much between the rural and urban locations.
Table 4 reports the mid value of secondary damages per kWh for three vintage 1995
facilities at the suburban (Capital) location using EXMOD, compared with mid values based
on Viscusi (1993), and with the mid value for a typical existing coal steam plant with average
emission rates for New York State.17  The existing plant is located at the urban (JFK) location,
to reflect the more probable location of in-place facilities.  The values are comparable for the
natural gas facilities, but differ importantly for the coal facilities.  The existing coal plant in
New York is expected to have environmental damages of over 6 mills/kWh, an order of
magnitude greater than would a new coal plant at a suburban location.  The Viscusi estimate
is four times greater still, or forty times greater than the EXMOD estimate for a new plant.
The reasons for the higher Viscusi estimate are that it does not reflect the role of emission
trading for SO2, and it places a high value on SO4 mortality; in addition, it is based on national
average emission rates in the late 1980s, which have since fallen not only due to the 1990
Clean Air Act Amendments but also due to a sizable shift toward increased use of lower sulfur
                                               
15 Ozone is of interest spatially because of the number of nonattainment areas relative to current National
Ambient Air Quality Standards in various parts of the country.  Ozone also is primarily a summer problem.
16 We use the current value of allowances of about $100/ton as a proxy for the present discounted value of
average avoided investments in abatement of about $300/ton when the program is fully binding around the year
2010 (Bohi and Burtraw, 1997).  This results in an estimate of additional benefits of $0.00058 per kWh.
17 The damages per ton of emissions are not necessarily constant across technologies because of differences in
design parameters such as stack height, the velocity of emissions from the stack, etc.Burtraw and Toman RFF 98-01-REV
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coal for strictly economic reasons.  Partially offsetting this is a lower average population
density exposed to these emissions at the national level than in New York State examples,
which tends to lower the Viscusi estimates.
Table 3. Range of levelized externality estimates for three conventional pollutants for a new















low 1.80 1.15 0.28 -0.02 2.64
mid 2.42 1.59 0.44 1.03 4.47




low 0.49 1.08 0.24 1.44 2.75
mid 0.64 1.48 0.40 2.19 3.81
high 0.77 1.81 0.52 2.79 4.66
Sterling site
(rural location)
low 0.29 0.98 -0.01 1.43 2.29
mid 0.41 1.39 0.11 2.05 3.14
high 0.50 1.73 0.21 2.54 3.82
Source:  Hagler-Bailly, 1995.
Table 4.  Monetized ancillary benefits in electricity generation
$ per megawatt hour $/ton CO2 $/ton carbon
New plants in New York State using
EXMOD (Hagler-Bailly, 1995)
Natural Gas Combustion Turbine 0.60 0.70 2.58
Natural Gas Combined Cycle 0.37 0.81 2.97
Coal (steam)* 3.81 3.51 12.87
Average emissions at 1980 facilities
(Viscusi et al., 1993)
Natural Gas Combustion Turbine 0.25 0.30 1.08
Natural Gas Combined Cycle 0.16 0.35 1.29
Coal (steam)* 23.69 21.85 80.08
Existing NY average plant (Rowe et al.,
1996; and Hagler-Bailly, 1995)
Coal (steam)* 7.47 6.89 25.25
* Estimates include avoided investments in abatement under the SO2 emission cap.Burtraw and Toman RFF 98-01-REV
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Estimates in the second column of Table 4 describe the ratio of secondary damages per
kWh to CO2 emissions per kWh, or in other words, the value of ancillary benefits that would
be achieved per ton of reduction in CO2 emissions achieved by reduced utilization of each of
these technologies.  The third column converts these estimates to benefits per ton carbon
reduction.  For example, reducing carbon emissions by one ton by reducing utilization of an
average coal steam plant in New York is predicted to yield $25 in ancillary benefits.  The
ancillary benefits illustrated in Table 4 can be compared to the conventional measure of cost
per ton of carbon emission reductions to arrive at an estimate of the net costs of reducing GHG
emissions.18
VI.   A  COMPARISON  OF  THE  ESTIMATES
The previous section demonstrated the potential difference that could result from using
facility-specific emission rates in place of the national average emission rates in modeling
emission changes in the electricity sector.  In this section we attempt to compare previous
ancillary benefit estimates along a common metric, by expressing several of the mid-value
estimates per ton reduction in carbon emissions.  These estimates are reported in Table 5.
Note that in every case there is a wide range of values around the mid-range estimate, which
we do not report.  Lower and upper bounds for each estimate range varies from its midpoint
by a factor of 2 to 10 or more.
Table 5 indicates a large variation across various studies in their mid-range ancillary
benefit estimates.  Three types of differences in the models account for the bulk of the differences
in the results.  One is the modeling of criteria pollutant emissions reductions.  The general
equilibrium models have the advantage in predicting emissions changes in the future because
they can account for changes in the quantity of electricity demand and substitution among
technologies.  However, they are likely to have less accuracy for near-term emission changes
than the partial equilibrium models because they have less detailed modeling of technology.
Second, the estimation and valuation of effects from emission changes varies among
the studies, and we believe it is relatively weak in the general equilibrium models.  The health
epidemiology and valuation literatures have developed considerably in the last few years, and
have shown the importance of spatial aspects in developing such estimates, which are missing
                                               
18 Our advice presumes that policy will be shaped taking an emission reduction goal as given, or that such a goal
will be developed independent of estimates of the direct benefits of GHG reductions.  However, the preferred
approach would be to combine ancillary benefits with direct benefits for comparison with costs.  One reason is
that when considering uncertainty in policy design (Weitzman, 1974), the measure of costs should reflect
behavioral responses.  Including ancillary benefits in the cost function reduces the estimate of social cost and
would understate behavioral responses, since those responses in reality would be based on costs born privately in
compliance with the program absent consideration of ancillary social benefits.  Hence, if the analysis is used to
consider what we term "net costs" to identify a preferred emission target, a quantitative benefit estimate is
implicit, and ancillary benefits should be included on this side of the benefit-cost calculus.  However, if the
emission goal is explicit and fixed, then we advise that ancillary benefits should be considered with costs to find
the least net cost means of achieving that goal.Burtraw and Toman RFF 98-01-REV
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Table 5.  Comparisons of Estimates of Ancillary Benefits per ton of Carbon Reduction
Source Targeted sectors, pollutants and policy
Average ancillary




Nationwide Motor Challenge voluntary program
(industry), analyzed at regional level; health effects from
NOx changes valued using PREMIERE, including




Nationwide seasonal gas burn in place of coal, analyzed at
regional level; health effects from NOx changes valued
using PREMIERE, including secondary nitrates,
excluding ozone effects
$2.64
(3) EXMOD Reduced utilization of existing (average emissions in
1992) coal steam plant at a suburban location in New
York; only PM, NOx and SO2 (under emission cap)
changes valued, including secondary particulates and
ozone effects; all health ,visibility and environmental
effects that could be quantified are included
$23.96
(4) Coal/PREMIERE Equal percentage reduction in utilization of existing
(1994) coal plants analyzed at state level; only health
effects from NOx changes valued using PREMIERE,




Equal percentage reduction in utilization of existing
(1994) coal plants analyzed at state level; only NOx
related mortality changes valued using PREMIERE,
including secondary particulates and excluding ozone, and




Economy-wide carbon tax with stabilization at 1990 levels
in 2000; human health effects from all criteria pollutants,
no secondary particulates or ozone.
$29.84
(7) Boyd et al. Economy-wide carbon tax; human health and visibility
effects calculated from reduced total emissions of all
criteria pollutants
$35.58
(8) Viscusi et al. Equal percentage reduction in utilization of existing (1980
average) coal steam plants; human health and visibility
effects from reduced total emissions of all criteria
pollutants
$78.85Burtraw and Toman RFF 98-01-REV
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in the general equilibrium models.  A third reason for the difference in per ton benefit estimates
is differences in sectoral coverage and coverage of pollutants or impacts.  For example, the
estimates presented range from a small program affecting the electricity sector to estimates for
the economy as a whole.  Also, for the most part they do not account for the SO2 emission cap.
With the goal to identify the ancillary benefit per ton of carbon reductions for a modest
carbon abatement program, we place greater confidence in the first four estimates in Table 5,
all of which reflect the impact of GHG reductions in the electricity sector.  These estimates
reflect the most detailed methodologies, including locational differences in emissions and
exposures, and they take into account the role of the SO2 cap in limiting ancillary benefits.
Note that these estimates suggest modest (less than $7/ton) benefits on average for the United
States as a whole, though benefits could be significantly higher in certain areas.  Restriction of
these estimates to the electricity sector is not too troublesome in evaluation of a modest policy
because this sector is the likely target of modest emission reductions, and the sector where
reductions may be least expensive.  The higher fifth estimate in the Table reflects alternative
assumptions about the scale of health impacts, the role of nitrates, and the economic valuation
of impacts.  The difference illustrates that ancillary benefits are sensitive to such assumptions,
but given the controversy surrounding these specific assumptions, we put less stock in it.
The first two studies in Table 5 indicate that subtle aspects of behavioral responses to
policies tend to mitigate the desired emission reductions.19  The ICF/PREMIERE example
estimates health benefits from changes in NOx emissions and transport (excluding ozone
effects) for a voluntary policy.  This estimate is low due to the fact that some of the reduced
electricity generation resulting from energy efficiency improvements will come from natural
gas units that have lower emission rates for NOx than do coal units and hence fewer ancillary
benefits obtain.  Dowlatabadi et al./PREMIERE reflects a seasonal (summer) burn of natural
gas in place of coal, and models health benefits from changes in NOx emissions and their
transport (excluding ozone effects). These results are low because increased emissions of NOx
from gas offsets somewhat the reductions from coal.20
The EXMOD estimate is greater than the two preceding because it does not account
for the bounceback effect that may result from increased utilization of another technology
such as natural gas to replace coal utilization, and because it is cast in a densely populated
area.  The EXMOD estimate uses average emission rates from an existing coal steam plant in
a relatively densely populated suburban area in New York State, with a reduced-form model
of atmospheric dispersion, exposure and valuation, and it accounts for SO2 trading as
discussed above.  This estimate includes health damages from airborne exposure to
particulates, NOx (including ozone) and changes in the location of SO2 emissions under the
                                               
19 The Dowlatabadi et al. estimates may exaggerate this effect because they reflect the capital stock circa 1987
and do not reflect improvements in gas technologies.
20 We ignore the Dowlatabadi et al. estimates for SO2 because they do not model the allowance trading program,
and we ignore the reduction in TSP because it is negligible.Burtraw and Toman RFF 98-01-REV
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cap, holding total emissions constant.  Collectively these are calculated to be 90-96 percent of
the damage from conventional pollutants through all environmental pathways.
The fourth estimate is comparable to the third, except that it is applied on a weighted
average national basis.  These four estimates suggest modest (less than $7/ton) benefits on
average for the United States as a whole, though benefits could be significantly higher in
certain areas.
The sensitivity of conclusions to the valuation of damages is illustrated by comparing
the PREMIERE and EXMOD estimates to the fifth estimate in Table 5, which uses assumptions
drawn from the recent Draft Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA) for new particulate and ozone
standards (USEPA, 1996b).  The Coal/PREMIERE example considers a 1 percent reduction in
utilization of coal fired electricity generation and calculates changes in CO2, SO2 and NOx
emissions at the regional level for use in PREMIERE.  The benefits per ton carbon reflect only
changes in NOx, excluding both ozone impacts and SO2 changes (due to the cap).  About
65 percent of the NOx related benefits result from decreased mortality.21
The Coal/PREMIERE/RIA example considers the same change in emissions, with
atmospheric transport calculated with PREMIERE, but with an assumption in the health
epidemiology that the mortality coefficient used in the RIA for PM2.5 applies to nitrates.  The
RIA also places greater weight on one mortality study, Pope et al. (1995), leading to greater
estimates of long-term mortality than does PREMIERE, which treats this as a high estimates
in a distribution of possible estimates.  Finally, the valuation of mortality effects in the RIA is
about 1.5 times that in PREMIERE (USEPA, 1996b).  On net this approach yields a valuation
of mortality impacts from NOX changes (excluding ozone impacts) of three times that from
PREMIERE.22
The final three estimates are the results from general equilibrium modeling.  We feel
the base on which valuations in the general equilibrium models have been constructed is
narrow, as illustrated by the fact that the estimates in Boyd et al., like those in Jorgenson
et al., are based on Viscusi et al.  (The Jorgenson et al. 1995 estimate is expressed as a
percentage of carbon tax revenue, and GHG reductions are not reported, so it is not shown in
Table 5.)  The Viscusi et al. value is reproduced from Table 4 for comparison.  This value
reflects a reduction in secondary pollutants absent geographic resolution, and the authors
report the value per ton of secondary pollutant.  We convert this using their source data to
dollars per kilowatt-hour of generation from a generic existing coal plant in the late 1980s,
and then convert to dollars per ton carbon reduction reflecting an assumption that the relative
                                               
21 SOx changes are not included due to the SO2 cap, but they would amount to $87 per ton carbon were
emissions not made up through the trading program.
22 One can also ask how the use of a reduced form version of the Advanced Statistical Trajectory Regional Air
Pollution (ASTRAP) for modeling atmospheric transport in PREMIERE compares with the use of Regional Acid
Deposition Model (RADM), which is the model used in the Draft RIA.  Burtraw et al., 1997 compared the two
directly and find RADM yields valuation numbers about 50 percent less than ASTRAP when considering
sulfates, but no comparison of nitrates was made.Burtraw and Toman RFF 98-01-REV
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emission rates remain constant.  The Goulder/Scheraga-Leary valuation is based on a different
review of EPA Regulatory Impact Assessments from the 1980s, which provides a little more
breadth to the analyses as a group.
The treatment of the SO2 cap represents another important distinction among the
studies.  When the cap is binding, emission reductions in one location are made up in another,
but emissions at one location are likely to reduce the need for investment in SO2 abatement at
another location.  This is usually not considered in cost estimates for CO2 reduction.  Our
estimates using PREMIERE and EXMOD include a secondary benefit of about $3 per ton of
carbon reduction from avoided investment in SO2 abatement stemming from reduced
utilization of coal.  This benefit is likely to be considerably smaller than the health benefit that
would be induced if total SO2 emissions were reduced by a GHG policy, leading to a reduction
in fine sulfate particles implicated in increased premature mortality (Burtraw et al., 1997).
An important corollary of this observation is that the marginal ancillary benefits from a
small reduction in GHGs are likely to differ from the marginal benefit from the last unit of GHG
reduction in a more aggressive program of aggregate GHG control.  Even if the underlying
atmospheric transport and health effects models are essentially linear, as the studies presented
here implicitly or explicitly assume, there will be a threshold at the point where GHG control has
made the SO2 cap no longer binding.  Beyond this point, health benefits from additional net
reductions in SO2 will accrue.  For example, Batelle's Second Generation Model cited in Scheraga
and Herrod (1993) estimates that a policy to stabilize CO2 emissions by the year 2000 will yield
reductions in annual SO2 emissions of 1 million tons beyond reductions that will be achieved by
the SO2 cap.  The Clinton Administration's unpublished analysis of the impacts of stabilizing
GHG emissions at 1990 levels in 2010 calculates even larger SO2 emissions reductions (on the
order of 4 million tons) and, using analysis derived from the same sources as EPA's RIA for a
new particulate standard, calculates a very large benefit from NOX and SO2 reduction.
We briefly summarize the European literature by starting with Ekins (1996) point
estimate of about $227 (converted to 1990 dollars) per ton in total benefits, based on his
analysis and evaluation of the half dozen or so studies he reviews.  About half of the estimated
benefits would come from reduced sulfur emissions, and this estimate does not take into
account the SO2 emission reductions that will result from the signing of the European Second
Sulphur Protocol in 1994.  Following the reasoning provided by Ekins and the studies he
reviews, we reduce this estimate to account for the Second Sulphur Protocol, to arrive at a
range of $33-$71 per ton (1990 dollars) for sulfur benefits only.23  Adding in benefits of about
                                               
23 Ekins adjusts his point estimate to account for planned reductions in sulfur emissions stemming from the
Second Sulfur Protocol signed in 1994 but not yet implemented, to arrive at an estimate of $25 for SO2 related
benefits per short ton in the UK only if realized as additional emission reductions, or $42 if realized as avoided
investments in abatement.  Note that the latter figure is far larger than the $3/ton for the U.S. that we estimate.
Ekins also notes benefits in the UK from reduced SO2 emissions range from 35-81 percent total (European)
secondary benefits applicable to changes in emissions from the UK.  We infer the range of $33-$71 (in 1990
dollars) if benefits are realized through additional emission reductions.Burtraw and Toman RFF 98-01-REV
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$105 per ton from reduced emissions of other pollutants increases this to a range of $138-$176,
with a mid-value of $157.  This value is relatively high, which may reflect the aggregate level
of modeling in these studies, different assumptions about health epidemiology, greater
population density in Europe,24 and the ecological effects resulting from on-shore atmospheric
transport of sulfur, in contrast to off-shore transport in the eastern U.S.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
How does one make sense of the welter of estimates in Table 5?  The first point is that
firm conclusions are all but impossible to draw at present, given the current state of knowledge.
Accordingly, we do not believe it is possible at this time to identify a single numerical "best
estimate" of benefits per ton carbon reduced for any particular GHG limitation, let alone for all
possible GHG limitations.  As discussed in more detail below, we believe there are modest but
nonetheless important ancillary benefits per ton of carbon emission reduction that would result
from a modest level of GHG control, and that the benefits may be more than modest in certain
locations (those with denser populations and greater exposures to damaging criteria pollutants).
The benefits per ton of carbon reduction could be larger with a greater degree of GHG control,
though it is difficult to gauge by how much.
In identifying the large uncertainties surrounding current estimates of ancillary
benefits, we have focused especially on the location of emissions reductions, the role of the
SO2 emissions cap, and the means by which emissions reductions are achieved (e.g.,
voluntary versus involuntary measures, and comprehensive measures versus measures that
allow increases in emissions from uncovered sources).  Additional factors include basic
questions about the baseline against which to measure the effects of policy options (e.g. trends
in criteria pollutant emissions), atmospheric modeling of the transport of these emissions, the
incidence of adverse effects of these emissions, and the economic valuation of avoided
adverse impacts.  The literature provides little in the way of estimates for ancillary benefits
other than those associated with the electricity sector.25  A more reliable and comprehensive
set of estimates must await the analysis of how GHG abatement policies would affect other
emissions sources, among other advances in knowledge.
The applicability of all these results is necessarily limited.  Specific utility-sector
policies for CO2 reduction may have different effects in different geographic areas than the
effects assumed in these estimates, including changes in the utilization of other technologies
besides coal-fired plants.  For example, an energy efficiency policy could reduce use of
natural gas as well as use of coal.  Moreover, policies affecting other sectors -- notably
transportation -- could also generate nontrivial ancillary environmental benefits.26  Further,
                                               
24 See Krupnick and Burtraw (1997) for a related discussion.
25 There are some estimates related to the social costs of transportation.  See Green et al. (1997).
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health effects do not exhaust all the environmental benefits.  Finally, benefits would be larger
with nonmarginal GHG mitigation policies that drive SO2 emissions below the regulatory cap.
In light of these limitations, it is tempting to embrace the last three, economy-wide
studies in Table 5 that attempt to describe the effects of nonmarginal GHG reductions and
include a variety of pollutants and impacts.  However, the methodologies in these studies
simply compute a total economic benefit from a national reduction in criteria pollutant
emissions.  They lack attention to locational differences in emissions and exposures, and they
inherently overestimate the total ancillary benefits from SO2 reduction by failing to take into
account the effect of the SO2 cap.  Hence, they may be better suited for examining the effect
of more substantial and broad scale GHG mitigation policies than for examining the effect of
more modest policies.
It is of interest to compare the various figures in Table 5 with the costs of GHG
abatement, although it is difficult to formulate such a comparison with the simple per-unit
values we have calculated for a number reasons.  The models that have been used to estimate
abatement costs give a wide range of answers, depending on critical assumptions in the
various models and on the level of abatement undertaken.
Both the Clinton Administration's analysis and a 1993 study by the Energy Modeling
Forum suggest that the marginal cost of achieving stabilization of U.S. emissions at 1990
levels in the year 2010 might be on the order of $100/ton (costs could be lower with greater
technical progress or robust international GHG emissions trading but they could be higher if
domestic GHG policies are poorly designed or technical progress lags).  The marginal costs of
smaller initial reductions are likely to be considerably lower; indeed there is reason to think
they would be close to zero (some would even argue less than zero, though we remain
skeptical).  This low cost suggests that the ancillary environmental benefits of even $3/ton of
carbon reduced, let alone $7-10/ton, could have a significant effect on the volume of
emissions reduction that is "no regret."  On the other hand, marginal ancillary benefits of even
$25/ton of carbon removed are clearly smaller than the marginal cost of significant GHG
reductions, and even the prospect of additional ancillary benefits from sulfate reductions with
a nonbinding SO2 cap would not close the gap.  Nevertheless, in assessing the cost of GHG
control for comparison with subjective estimates of the value of climate change risk
reduction, these ancillary benefits clearly warrant attention.
Our analysis indicates that national average ancillary benefits from modest reductions
in greenhouse gases from coal-burning electric utilities, where the average cost of each ton of
carbon reduced may be in the order of $10-20 are likely to be modest ($3-7 benefit per ton of
carbon reduced).  Larger ancillary benefits on the order of $12-18 per ton of carbon reduced
on average, and $20-$30 at the margin, could be obtained with a more substantial national
policy for GHG control, as would be needed to stabilize national emissions at 1990 levels
(where the average costs of each ton of carbon reduced may be on the order of $40-50 and
marginal cost around $100 per ton).  We identify a rough rule of thumb to characterize the
relationship between ancillary benefits and the costs of carbon mitigation policies.  The
evidence suggests ancillary benefits average about 30 percent of the cost of carbon reduction,Burtraw and Toman RFF 98-01-REV
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over the range of policies we consider, though we emphasize there is large uncertainty and
variability in these estimates.
Lessons for Policy
Some lessons for the design of policy can be derived from our analysis, though these
lessons must be interpreted with care.  Ancillary benefits may be larger for GHG policies that
more heavily target coal use, but this has at least as much to do with the continued use of old,
relatively polluting boilers as with the use of coal itself.  And GHG abatement policies that
have relatively greater effects and impose greater costs on newer plants will have the perverse
effect of creating a new bias against construction of new facilities, resulting in continued use
of older facilities and lower ancillary benefits.  By the same token, energy efficiency
programs whose effects displace gas use to a significant extent, as well as coal, will have
smaller ancillary benefits.
A second set of lessons concerns spatial differentiation in ancillary benefits.  GHG
mitigation that occurs in areas especially conducive to the formation of secondary pollutants
(ozone and secondary PM), and at sources whose effluent reaches large populations, confer
larger ancillary benefits compared to other options.
The possible trend in ancillary benefits over time also is of interest.  It is often argued
that abatement costs associated with a goal like GHG emissions stabilization will rise over
time because of growing energy demand, though this trend will be ameliorated by technical
progress and ultimately by a transition to noncarbon backstop energy resources.  While this
argument is reasonable, one might also expect the ancillary benefits per ton of pollutant to rise
over time as well.  This is because of growth in population density and congestion, as well as
growth in income, can be expected to yield an increase in the willingness to pay for
environmental protection.27  This may be ameliorated by improvements in air quality over
time, which would lower the ancillary effects that could be obtained by a GHG policy.
Cost estimates of GHG policies generally fail to anticipate a changing regulatory
baseline that is expected to lead to air quality improvements over time and raise the cost of
more heavily polluting fuels.  Hence, these GHG cost estimates would overstate the relative
opportunity cost of GHG policies.  In comparing benefits and costs, it would be misleading to
include improvements in baseline air quality in calculating ancillary benefits while not
including the effect these changes have on the opportunity cost of GHG policies.  We correct
for this in some of the studies we review in Table 5 by adding in the benefits of avoided
investments in SO2 abatement under the cap that would result from GHG policies.
It is important to be cautious about the implications of ancillary benefits for the
desired level of GHG control.  Ancillary benefits are important enough that they should be
considered jointly with costs of carbon reduction to identify the preferred policies for society.
However, the policies that maximize net benefits for society may not be ones that maximize
                                               
27 Krutilla (1967).Burtraw and Toman RFF 98-01-REV
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ancillary benefits nor ones that achieve GHG reductions at the lowest gross cost.  For
instance, a GHG emissions trading program may minimize the direct cost of abatement
associated with a GHG reduction target, but it will not necessarily minimize the social cost
including ancillary benefits.  The preferred policy for achieving a stated level of emission
reduction is the one with the lowest net costs of GHG control after allowing for ancillary
benefits.  An ideal policy would force emitters to recognize the social opportunity costs of
GHG emissions together with the costs of criteria air pollutant emissions.  At the same time,
the choice of policies can have important distributional effects, both in economic costs and
ancillary benefits, that must be considered as well.
Finally, we note that ancillary benefits from GHG policies in developing nations may
be even more significant relative to the cost of these policies than those measured in the U.S.
and Europe because of lower existing levels of pollution control and lower efficiency in
energy use in these countries.  The short run and geographically proximate nature of these
benefits can play an important role in shaping GHG policies in developing countries.28
                                               
28 Ongoing efforts to assess these issues are described in Dowlatabadi (1997) and Davis et al. (1997).Burtraw and Toman RFF 98-01-REV
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